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Abstract: The paper looks for evidence of grease and sand effects in Europe, in
particular the possibility that the natural rate of unemployment is affected run by the
inflation rate. Looking at four countries, France, Germany, the Netherlands and
Switzerland, the paper reports some preliminary evidence that the long-run rate of
unemployment is a nonlinear function of inflation. The particular shape of the
empirical relationship supports the view that a moderate level of inflation provides
some "grease" to the price and wage setting process. In particular, the long-run rate of
unemployment is found to reach a maximum between 0.5% and 1%, and to quickly
decline for higher rate of inflation. For the range of inflation rates observed in the
sample countries, there is no evidence of sand effects, that uncertainty associated with
inflation adversely affect the long-run rate of unemployment.
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1. Introduction
When the ECB announced its definition of price stability, “a year-on-year increase in
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%”
over the medium run, it signaled a historical shift towards a performance unheard of
in the postwar period. This shift is illustrated in Figure 1which shows the centered
three-year moving average of German inflation. Under this interpretation of the
medium run, the ECB's objective has been achieved in about one year out of three. In
Europe, Switzerland's record is better, but still only fits that definition of price
stability in 40% of the postwar years. Simply put, inflation below 2% has been the
exception, not the rule since the end of World War II.
Figure 1
It is natural to wonder, therefore, how economies perform when inflation is durably
maintained at such a low rate. The older literature on the optimum rate of inflation
emphasized two aspects: “shoe-leather” costs and public finance. According to the
shoe-leather cost view developed by Bailey (1956), the higher is the inflation rate, the
more costly it is to hold cash. Because cash yields utility (or raises productivity), a
policy that reduces the cost of money is desirable. This reasoning leads to Friedman's
rule that the social optimum occurs when the nominal interest rate is zero and the
inflation is negative; only then the marginal cost of money borne by users is equal to
the marginal cost of producing money, which is negligible.
Running against this logic is the public finance approach developed by Phelps (1973)
and others. Inflation is a tax and the principle of optimum taxation is that the marginal
costs of all taxes should be equalized. Since all taxes are distortionary, there is an
optimal level of distortion for inflation as well. Estimates of the optimal rate of
inflation under this heading have been found to be very low.
The literature on optimal inflation has been revived, and made more realistic, in the
wake of the debate on rules vs. discretion. Once it is recognized that central bank
credibility is a public good, it becomes important that inflation be predictable.2
Consumers and producers can only accurately plan for the future --and save and invest
accordingly-- when future relative prices are predictable. While predictability does not
necessarily require low inflation, the evidence is that the higher is inflation the less
stable are relative prices, and thus the wider is the range of uncertainty that matters for
key economic decisions.
This reasoning implicitly assumes that there is no cost to price stability. Akerlof,
Dickens and Perry (1996, 2000) challenge this assumption. For various reasons which
include efficiency wages, fairness, nominal downward rigidity and information costs,
they argue that a moderate level of inflation provides some "grease" to the price and
wage setting process. Such a source of real wage flexibility, in turn, durably reduces
the natural, or long-run, rate of unemployment. Yet, when inflation rises, the implied
money illusion -including information costs- dissipates and the burden of price
uncertainty rises. This is when inflation exerts a "sand effect" on the natural rate of
unemployment. Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) report evidence based on micro data
consistent with the presence of grease effects at low inflation rates, while the sand
effect, initial nil, increasingly offsets the grease effect as inflation rises. This finding
suggests the existence of an optimal, nonzero rate of inflation which is estimated by
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) to be in the 1.5-4% range. On the other side, Card
and Hyslop (1996) report no evidence in favor of a positive rate of inflation (but see
Akerlof, Dickens and Pery (1996) who argue that measurement errors and the partial
equilibrium nature of the model lead them to underestimate nominal rigidities).
The evidence so far is limited to the US. It is natural to wonder how it plays out in
Europe. Given that Europe's labor markets sharply differ from those in the US, there
is no presumption that sand and grease effects are the same. European labor markets
are known to involve more generous benefits and to rely more on collective
bargaining than the US (Nickell, 1997). While such features do not directly affect
wage and price setting as emphasized in the grease and sand literature, they do affect
workers' incentives in trading-off real wage cuts against employment protection which
may put grease effects at a premium in Europe. In addition, in many countries,
unilateral nominal wage cuts are explicitly ruled out by existing legislation (Holden,
1994) which implies that very low inflation may result in significantly higher
unemployment in the presence of shocks. (Holden, 2000).3
The present paper undertakes to seek evidence on the relationship between steady
state unemployment and inflation in a selected group of European countries. The
chosen countries are the two larger ones (France and  Germany) plus one country that
has exhibited particularly low rates of inflation over the last decades, Switzerland, and
another country with a reasonable good inflation performance, the Netherlands. There
is no attempt to track down the channels of grease and sand effects, for example by
using micro-data as in the papers mentioned above. The strategy is rather to test
directly at the macro-level for any evidence of grease and sand effects. The approach
is presented in the next section. Section 3 describes the estimation strategy and the
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Investigation Strategy
2.1. Approach
The view that central banks ought to aim at very low inflation because it could affect
unemployment is a statement about the steady state. This is made clear in the ECB's
presentation of its strategy:
"A monetary policy that maintains price stability in a credible and lasting
way will make the best overall contribution to improving economic
prospects and raising living standards."
Monthly Bulletin, January 1999, p. 39.
The ECB's statement is justified by appealing to arguments which are similar to those
spelled out in the sand-effect literature. One way of testing this view is to test for
inflation effects on long-term growth. Results produced by Bruno and Easterly (1996)
and Barro (1997) confirm that growth slows down when inflation remains above 20 to
40%. What happens at lower levels is not known.
Another approach is to look at unemployment. The view that low inflation helps
achieve low unemployment in the long term can be interpreted as a statement that the
long-run Phillips curve is positively sloped. The view that grease and sand effect may4
partially offset each other to a different degree depending on inflation implies that the
long-run Phillips curve is nonlinear. This observation inspires the strategy adopted
here, following Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000), who find evidence of nonlinearity, and
Groshen and Schweitzer (1997), who find a positively-slopped relationship. Both look
only at US data, however.
1
2.2. Return of the NAIRU?
The use of a Phillips curve apparatus to track down nonlinearities assumes the
existence of a NAIRU, often referred to as -and confused with- the natural rate of
unemployment (two celebrated misnomers). Both the NAIRU and the Phillips curve
have repeatedly been pronounced dead but never fail to remerge when needed, i.e.
when large and sustained changes in unemployment and/or inflation occur. There is
now a large literature on the re-emergence of the Phillips curve as a way of describing
aggregate data.
2 The verdict is far from unanimous.
For the US, most researchers find that there exist a relationship between inflation and
unemployment, but there is disagreement on the validity of its theoretical
underpinnings and on the significance of the results. For example, among those
sympathetic to the concept, Clarida and Gali (1999) argue that traditional backward-
looking models are misspecified and offer their own forward-looking approach.
Gordon (1998) argues that, provided the natural rate is allowed to vary over time, the
repeated estimation of the Phillips curve for the US over three decades amounts to an
impressively stable stylized fact.
3 Staiger et al. (1997) provide evidence that
traditional estimates are robust to specification choices, but they also show that the
natural rate is estimated with a great degree of imprecision.
                                                
1 Fischer  (1996) discusses nonlinearities in the Phillips curve at very low rates of inflation.
2 Representative of this revival is the special issue of the Journal of Monetary Policy (1999) and the
symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (1997).
3 The point by Galbraith (1997) that the concept of a time varying natural rate is useless unless we can
explain and foresee these changes is well taken but not overwhelming. There exist a great many
concepts in economics which are problematic and ill-explained but prove to be a useful way of
organizing the evidence and theorize about it: the list includes the stock of capital subject of a famed
controversy between Solow and Robinson in the 1950s, the definition of the long-run or Tobin's q.5
The evidence for Europe is less satisfactory than for the US.
4 The crucial negative
effect of unemployment on inflation is not always found with European data.
5
Sometimes, it is the change in the unemployment rate which affects inflation, not the
level itself, suggesting the presence of hysteresis. Hysteresis implies that there is no
meaningful NAIRU, possibly even that the unemployment rate is nonstationary and,
indeed, stationarity is always rejected.
The NAIRU and the natural rate of unemployment are two different concepts. The
former relies on the existence of a Phillips curve, the latter is a statement about the
nature of equilibrium in the labor market. The NAIRU can be seen as a convenient
shortcut -when it works- to estimate the natural rate. Failure to estimate a Phillips
curve relationship, or the presence of hysteresis, does not invalidate the concept of a
natural rate as famously defined by Friedman as the equilibrium rate of
unemployment. Failure of estimating a Phillips curve does not have to translate into
the impossibility of estimating a natural rate of unemployment, and issue taken up
again below.
2.3. Grease and Sand: Slopes and Nonlinearities
The standard Phillips curve specification is:
(1)  t t t t t t
e
t Z X u u a e g b a p p + + + + D + = - ' ' 1
where X is a vector of variables which may affect inflation temporarily and are
therefore I(0), while Z is a vector of variables which may affect the natural rate and
are I(1). The unemployment rate appears both in level and first-difference to
acknowledge Gordon's (1998) claim, informed by experimentation with US data, that
omitting the first difference results in misspecification.
In the absence of hysteresis a „ 0 and the natural rate is recovered as:
                                                
4 See e.g. Blanchard and Katz (1997).
5 This is presumably why most researchers work with the output gap instead of the unemployment rate.
Given the aim of the present paper –looking at long-run effects-- this approach is not feasible.6
(2)
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The grease and sand arguments imply a long-run link between the rate of
unemployment and inflation. The long-run rate of unemployment  t u
_
, possibly time-
varying, is taken here to be an estimate of the natural rate. Long run inflation  t
_
p  is
defined as the possibly time-varying rate towards which actual inflation is expected to
converge in the long run. The grease effect hypothesis is that, starting from perfect
price stability, increases in long-run inflation initially reduce the natural rate. As the
grease effects dissipate, the natural rate becomes independent of inflation. Thus  t u
_
 is
a function of  t
_
p  which is initially decreasing. The sand effect hypothesis is that  t u
_
 is
increasing with  t
_
p , not necessarily monotonously. The absence of grease and sand
effects implies a vertical long-run Phillips curve. Grease and sand effects are not
mutually exclusive: at very low inflation grease effects could dominate, with sand
effects setting in when inflation becomes more variable. Or, conversely, sand effects
might dominate when perfect price stability is being lost but then get overwhelmed by
grease effects. These hypotheses are summarized in Figure 2. Testing grease and sand
effects, or the combination of both, therefore implies testing for a relationship,
possibly but not necessarily nonlinear, between  t u
_





3.1. Sample and Time Series Properties
The paper looks at the two largest European economies (France and Germany) and at
two countries which have experienced periods of low-inflation, the Netherlands and
Switzerland. Since the evidence from Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000) is that nonlinearities
mostly occur for inflation rates between 0% and 4%, it is essential that the sample
period includes as many years as possible when inflation was in this range. This7
imposes going as far back as possible in the postwar period, certainly before the
1970s. Unfortunately, this requirement severely restricts the availability of variables,
especially those which have been found to affect the natural rate. In the end, most data
have been collected for the period 1960-1999.
There is some debate (see e.g. Gruen et al., 1999) regarding the desirable frequency at
which the data is sampled. In the case of the US, Staiger et al. (1997) show that the
results are robust to using quarterly or monthly data. Since the emphasis here is on
long run relationships, short run fluctuations are more a nuisance (raising issues of
seasonality and serial correlation) than a source of useful information. Gains in
degrees of freedom are frequently offset by the need to introduce long lags. For these
reasons the chosen frequency is annual.
As the Phillips curve is essentially an empirical relationship, its precise specification
must depend on the time series properties of the variable of interests, mainly the rate
of inflation and the rate of unemployment. Inflation is measured with the consumer
price index (source: International Financial Statistics).
6 For all the countries in the
sample and all variables, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that the inflation and
unemployment rates are integrated of order one.
7
3.2. Expected and Long-Term Inflation
A key issue is how to treat expected inflation p
e. A frequent procedure (Gordon 1998,
Gruen 1999, Staiger et al. 1996) is to use lagged inflation or ARMA-generated
forecasts. Here I start by following Debelle and Vickery (1998) who propose to take
the difference between the nominal rate on long-term bonds and a measure of the
world real interest rate r*:
(3) * r i
LT e - = p
                                                
6 The preliminary version also looked at the consumption deflator and the GDP deflator.
7 The conclusion is robust to the use of trends for testing stationarity in levels and of a constant for
testing for stationarity in first-differences. Only in very few instances are the results doubtful.8
where the world real interest rate is computed as the difference between the long-term
US Treasury bond rate and a centered five-year moving average of US CPI inflation
(IFS data). Debelle and Vickery (1998) report that the results are not sensitive to the
precise calculation of the real interest rate. As a check I also use estimates published
by the European Commission and the OECD, see further below. The estimates of p
e
are shown in the Appendix (Figure A1).
Because the quality of the expectation measure is open to question, and given the
popularity of the use of lagged inflation as a measure of expected inflation, I allow for
a correction term 
e
t t p p - -1 , augmenting (1) as follows:
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which leads to the estimated form:
(5) t t t t t t
e
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with 0 < l < 1. If l = 0, the measured expectation term is confirmed by the data
while if l =1 it is lagged inflation which offers the better description.
We are interested in the impact of long-term inflation on the natural rate. In principle,
long-term inflation 
_
t p  is defined as the situation where  t
e
t t p p p = =
_
 but this
definition is not sufficient to derive a time series. In what follows, 
_
t p is computed as a




The hypothesis that the natural unemployment rate is affected by long-term inflation
can be tested by appropriately specifying Zt. In order to test for the grease and sand
effects represented in Figure 2,  we need to allow the natural employment rate to be a
nonlinear function of long-term inflation. A solution is to use polynomials of





t t t t Z p p p = . A problem with this procedure is that as
_
t p increases, the implied natural rate goes to infinity in absolute value, an unappealing
feature at variance with the behavior postulated in Figure 2 which assumes that the9
inflation effect dissipates when inflation becomes large so that neutrality prevails at
high rates. For this reason I allow for an exponential decay factor, replacing Z’g in (5)
with 
_
exp()' Z qpg , with q<0.
3.4. Time varying natural rate
The view that the natural rate has remained constant over the last four decades is
untenable for most OECD countries and indeed most recent estimates of the Phillips
curve allow it to vary over time. Sand and grease effects may be the source of such
changes but there may be other factors as well. Consequently Zt should also include
all the variables which may affect the natural unemployment rate over and above
long-run inflation. Several possibilities are explored.
The best approach is to deal directly with those features of the labor market which are
known to affect the natural rate. The literature has produced a list of relevant
variables. Recent surveys by Nickell (1997) and Blanchard and Wolfers (1999)
identify the generosity of unemployment benefits, collective wage bargaining
institutions and union activity, labor taxes and employment protection, as long-lasting
sources of changes in the natural rate of unemployment. Unfortunately the
corresponding data is only available at best from the mid-1970s.
8 The bias due to
omitted variables argues in favor of shortening the sample accordingly but that would
imply restricting the sample to the post-1975 period which would eliminate the crucial
low-inflation years of the 1960s. Any implication drawn from estimates obtained over
a period largely dominated by inflation above 5% would be in the nature of out-of-
sample forecasts, therefore highly speculative.
A shortcut is to include symptoms of the kind of market efficiencies which affect the
natural rate. The literature on job search, e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
provides much of the theoretical underpinning  for the concept of a natural rate. This
literature argues that the speed of exit from unemployment is a key determinant of
                                                
8 I am grateful to Olivier Blanchard and Tito Boeri for making their data available, even if, in the end, I
have not been able to implement them.10
long-run unemployment. The exit rate can be approximated (inversely) by the
proportion of workers who are long-term unemployed. This variable, however
displays cyclical as well as long-run fluctuations. Low frequency movements were
computed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, but failed to enter significantly.
9
An alternative is to allow for the intercept included in Zt to be time varying by
applying a Kalman filter. This is the approach adopted inter alia by Debelle and
Vickery (1998), Gordon (1998), Gruen et al. (1999), Staiger et al. (1996). Akerlof et
al. (1996, 2000) also allow for a time varying rate of unemployment through recursive
estimation. Extensive efforts to obtain plausible estimates for the sample countries
have failed and are not reported.
In a series of recent papers, Phelps and co-authors have developed an asset valuation
view of the natural rate, see e.g., Phelps and Zoega (2000) for an application to
Europe. They view the economy as being driven by low-frequency shifts in
productivity expectations, structural booms and slumps. Such shifts, which may last
for decades, affect the value of labor to firms and result in lasting changes in the
demand for labor. Given the supply of labor, the natural rate of unemployment varies
accordingly. They view labor as largely firm-specific, implying that trained labor
carries a shadow price which may differ from its direct cost. The shadow price of
labor is not observable, but Phelps and Zoega argue that the expected productivity
shifts simultaneously affect the shadow price of capital, which can be approximated
by Tobin's average q, which is observable. Thus a measure of Tobin's q (the ratio of
share values to the investment deflator, normalized to be unity on average over the
sample period; source: OECD) is introduced in Zt.
In the end, all else failing, I allow for a time trend which may capture both demand
and supply effects in the labor market.
4. Results
                                                
9 The hazard rate could also be affected by long-run inflation, thus giving rise to collinearity. To allow
for this possibility I experimented with the residual from the hazard rate's projection on a polynomial of
long-term inflation. The variable is never significant either.11
The focus is on testing the hypothesis that the natural rate of unemployment is
affected by long-term, or steady-state, inflation. I proceed in two steps. First I estimate
standard Phillips curves, adding second and third degree polynomials of long-term
inflation with exponential decay. Then, I directly estimate the rate of unemployment
on the polynomial with exponential decay, treating the relationship as cointegrating.
In the estimated equation (5), in line with the literature, Xt allows for imported
inflation and oil shocks by including the difference between the rate of increase of
imported goods and inherited inflation  1 - - t
m
t p p . Importantly, there has not been any
"specification search" for lags and other features which can improve the fit. The only
exception is the inclusion of dummy variables which account for special events such
as price controls or the 1968 social unrest in France (not reported).
4.1. Phillips Curve Estimates
Table 1 reports estimates of (5) modified as follows:
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where  ) (
_
p P is a second or third-order polynomial of long-run inflation and  0 £ q . In a
number of cases the nonlinear least-squares procedure has been found to produce
local maxima of the likelihood function. In these cases the decay parameter q was
estimated using a grid search (steps of 0.01).
The only countries where the effect of lagged unemployment on current inflation is
found to be statistically significant are Germany and Switzerland. For France and the
Netherlands it is the first difference that seems to matter most, an indication of
hysteresis, but the effect is very imprecisely estimated. This barely confirms the
difficulties often reported in estimating Phillips curves in Europe.
Nonlinearities are found in all countries except France. The sign pattern is broadly
similar, but not indentical across countries. For France and Germany, the pattern
suggests that, starting from zero inflation, the natural rate first increases and then
decreases, for the Netherlands and Switzerland pure sand effects seem to be present.12
Still, the coefficient for the unemployment rate remains too imprecisely estimated to
allow for computation of the natural rate.
Table 1
4.2. Direct Estimates of the Unemployment Rate
The difficulty in precisely isolating and measuring an effect of unemployment on
inflation challenges the notion of a NAIRU. But it does not invalidate the concept of a
natural rate defined as the rate of unemployment which corresponds to the economy's
equilibrium and does not depend on the existence of a Phillips curve.
Estimation of the natural rate using requires modeling the labor market. However, as
noted above, the labor market variables needed to identify demand and supply are not
available over a period long enough to include the low inflation years of the 1960s.
For this reason I estimate the reduced form of unemployment (2). Alternatively, what
follows can be interpreted as the cointegrating relationship within a Phillips curve
now seen as an error-correction model.  However, since we are interested in
nonlinearities in the effect of long-run inflation, the cointegration interpretation
cannot be pushed too far either.
10
With these caveats in mind, the following specification follows from (6):
(7)
u
t t t t t q P c u e g p p q + + + = ' ) ( ) exp(
_ _
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Equation (7) is a minimal description of labor market equilibrium. Given wage
rigidity, it is not expected to hold at every point in time. The error term e
 u, a measure
of the unemployment gap, may well be serially correlated but serial correlation does
                                                
10 A linear approximation including polynomials of long-term inflation cannot be properly considered a
cointegration relationship. At least it precludes the use of Johansen's rank procedure which searches for
several cointegrating vectors.13
not invalidate the estimates if (7) is seen as a cointegration relationship and (8) as the
error-correction model version of the Phillips curve.
Table 2 shows estimates of (7) for the four countries in the sample. As before, a grid
search is used to estimate the decay parameter when the nonlinear procedure is driven
to a local optimum. For each country, the table reports results for second and third
order polynomials, including the p-value of the F test that the coefficients of the
polynomial terms are jointly non-significant. The strong rejection of this hypothesis
provides support for sand or grease hypotheses. However, the polynomial terms are
not precisely estimated in the case of Switzerland, and slightly better in the case of
Germany.
Note that in all cases, the time trend is significant, presumably picking up some of the
missing labor institution variables not available over the sample period. Note also that
the role of Tobin's q is confirmed in all countries, even though the sign is not the
expected one in the case of Switzerland.
Table 2
4.4. Simulations
It is hard to read through the combination of the exponential decay term and
polynomials. Figure 3 shows the results of simulations performed using the equations
reported in Table 2, setting the terms others than inflation at their sample mean. To
that effect, I use the second-order polynomial estimates and allow the inflation rate to
vary from 0% to 20%. The figure also shows the 95% confidence interval.
11
The pattern is broadly similar across countries. Starting from zero long-run inflation,
the natural rate of unemployment rises to reach a maximum when inflation is around
1-2%. The adverse effect then declines smoothly in France and Switzerland (grease
effects dissipate), eventually rising in the case of Germany and the Netherlands (sand
                                                
11 Since (11) is non-linear, the standard errors have been computed by linearizing the equation.14
effects kick in). The width of the confidence interval should be kept in mind in
interpreting the results.
The figures suggest the presence of a grease effect at very low inflation rates, except
for France when long-run inflation is lowest at zero inflation. Grease effects set in
when in inflation is between 1-2% and 5-7%, with long-term unemployment typically
rising beyond this range.
Figure 3
5. Robustness Checks
There are many good reasons to be skeptical about the results. To start with, the
estimates are far from precise, yet the presence of nonlinearities is strongly
supported.
12 How sensitive are the results to variants? In this section, I investigate two




The sample period used for each country covers about 40 years, many of which were
years of inflation significantly higher than the 0-2% range of interest to countries
member of the European Monetary Union (during the period 1960-99, annual
inflation less than 2% was observed 5 times in France, 13 times in Germany, 7 times
in the Netherlands and 14 times in Switzerland). Pooling the four countries together
provides a sample of 39 years with less than 2% inflation.
The procedure is as follows: equation (7) is estimated with panel data, allowing for
country-specific effects for all the variables –including the constant—but restricting
                                                
12 It bears emphasizing that I have not embarked on specification searches designed to deliver
supportive evidence for sand and/or grease effects.
13 I am indebted to Stefan Gerlach for suggesting this idea.15
the polynomial terms to be the same. This, of course, assumes that the nonlinearity is
the same in all four countries, a plausible assumption in view of Figure 3. The decay
term q is arbitrarily set at –0.50.
Table 3
The results shown in Table 3 for the second-order polynomial
14 are quite strong. All
variables are quite precisely estimated. Figure 4 presents the corresponding pattern.
Since all four country-specific curves are parallel, only one curve is shown: it is
normalized to reach zero asymptotically, thus depicting the pure effect of long-term
inflation on long-term inflation. The figure strongly suggests that zero inflation does
not deliver the lowest long-term inflation rate. Grease effects are present. The long-
run unemployment rate is highest when long-run inflation reaches a rate of 0.6%,
declining quickly thereafter. The size of the effect is surprisingly –some will say
implausibly—large, certainly superior to the estimated margin of error.
Figure 4
5.2. Alternative Measures of Inflation Expectations
The foregoing estimates use a measure of expected inflation derived from long-term
interest rate. It may be objected that capital controls and other financial repression
measures have long been in place in Europe and that, therefore, the interest rate may
be driven by administrative restrictions.
15 How do the results depend on this particular
measure? To attempt to answer that question, I have assembled two sets of historical
forecasts. The first set consists of the Autumn forecasts produced since the early
seventies by the European Commission and presented in detail in Keereman (1999).
The second set includes the forecasts published since the mid-seventies by the OECD
in the December issue of its Economic Outlook. I have built a “consensus forecast” by
averaging the Commission’s and OECD’s forecasts for the years when they are both
                                                
14 Results for a third-degree polynomial are equally strong.
15 Indeed, a close look at Figure A1 suggests caution, for example the strongly negative rates for
Switzerland in 1984. For a general overview of external and internal financial repression in Europe, see
Wyplosz (2001).16
available. When only the Commission’s forecasts are available (typically over 1970-
1975) I use only these. In earlier years when none of the forecasts are available, to
avoid losing degrees of freedom and throeing out the low inflation years, I revert to
the previous expectation measures constructed with the long-term interest rate. Figure
A1 presents this measure of expected inflation as well.
Table 4, patterned after Table 2, presents the results of the corresponding estimation.
There are a number of significant differences between the two tables. Occasionally,
the results based on published forecasts are weaker. This is especially the case for
Switzerland where it is impossible to reject the null that the polynomial terms are
zero.
Table 4
What difference do these alternative results make? Figure 5 presents for each country
the estimated relationship using the second order polynomials in Tables 2 and 4,
respectively labeled UBAR_D2 and UBAR2_D2. The general shape remains
unchanged for France. For Switzerland, zero inflation is where long-term
unemployment is lowest when using the “consensus forecasts”, but this is the country
for which we can reject the presence of a polynomial with the alternative dataset.




Taken at face value, the results presented here imply that a sand effect is present at
low inflation rates in Europe, at least in the sample countries. On the basis of this
effect, one size fits all EMU member countries, a piece of good news for the ECB.
There is dark side to that piece of news, however: the 0-2% inflation target set by the
ECB corresponds to the range where the grease effect is largest. Based on the panel
estimation, the grease effect is found to raise the natural unemployment rate by some
2 to 4 percentage points in about the middle of the ECB’s inflation target range. In
order to significantly reduce the effect, the ECB ought to aim at an inflation rate of
more than 5%, a rate clearly beyond the current range of acceptability. Simply
allowing inflation to be, in the long run, around 4% would go a long way towards
eliminating the adverse effect.
One interesting question is whether maintaining a low rate of inflation for a protracted
period of time eventually leads firms and employees to fully internalize the evolution
of prices and thus avoid falling victim to the information problems which are
presumed to generate sand effects. Detailed country estimates do not strongly support
this optimistic assumption. Both Germany and Switzerland, the countries which have
had the best track record in terms of low inflation –by no way impeccable—do not
appear to behave very differently from the others. The only hint that there might be
such a virtuous effect comes from the rejection of nonlinearity with the alternative
“consensus forecast” of inflation in the case of Switzerland.
It is essential, however, to keep in mind that this is a preliminary study, calling for
more work, possibility the kind of microeconomic studies that has been carried out in
the US. For that reason only, the results presented here would be open to considerable
caution. In addition, the estimates are admittedly less than overwhelming. The poor
performance of Phillips curve estimates for European countries is in line with
previous findings. Even in the US where the Phillips curve performs better, Staiger et
al. (1997) emphasize the presence of large standard errors in estimates of the natural
rate. The fact that the effect of unemployment on inflation is imprecisely estimated
casts doubt on the existence of the NAIRU, an empirical construct anyway.18
On the other hand, the direct estimates of the natural –here proxied by the long-term--
unemployment rate are more satisfactory, theoretically and empirically. The concept
of a natural rate of unemployment is better rooted in accepted principles but its
estimation requires a fully articulated model of the labor market. Unfortunately, such
an approach, pioneered by Layard et al. (1991) and recently surveyed e.g. in
Blanchard and Katz (1997), requires variables which are typically not available before
the late 1970s. This would eliminate from the sample many of the low inflation years.
Since the study is mostly concerned with near-zero inflation, this approach cannot be
undertaken with European data, at least not yet. The paper instead relies on a reduced
form, with all the drawbacks known to be associated with such an approach. Most
worrisome is the fact that a number of variables known to affect the labor market are
omitted for lack of availability.
This is clearly an important topic. At this stage, we can only conclude that the ECB’s
view, that near-zero inflation is good for the economy and hence for the natural rate of
unemployment, is not borne out by the evidence presented here. Cautious readers will
also conclude that the opposite case, that near-zero inflation is harmful because of the
presence of sand effects, is not made either. Indeed, at this stage, the most reasonable
conclusion seems that we do not know yet how low inflation should be.19
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Germany France Netherlands Switzerland
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -77.20 ** 0.67 -455.51 -0.94
-3.68 0.86 -0.26 -0.98
p
e
t - pt-1 0.25 ** 0.41 ** 0.41 ** 0.23 **
3.23 6.48 4.01 2.52
p
m
t- pt-1 0.07 0.15 ** 0.05 ** 0.16 **
1.52 8.83 2.46 3.93
qt-1 -0.36 -0.21 0.00 0.70
-0.78 -0.17 0.01 1.58
Dut-1 0.02 -0.29 0.21 -0.29
0.14 -0.98 1.64 -0.63
Ut-1 -0.43 ** 0.21 -0.12 -0.50 *
-2.53 0.80 -0.64 -1.92
q -0.28 -0.71 -0.20 -1.35 **
-1.04 -3.57
constant 71.20 ** -30.03 445.11 0.81
3.94 -0.75 0.26 0.85
‘pt-1 33.82 ** 32.82 107.08 2.41 *
3.26 0.78 0.43 1.87
‘pt-1
2 -2.12 * -9.86 2.64 1.87 **
-2.06 -0.73 0.13 2.89
‘pt-1
3 1.00 ** 0.80 1.54 ** 0.71 **
3.29 0.55 4.61 3.30
Adj. R
2 0.62 0.78 0.68 0.36
SEER 0.76 0.80 0.93 1.39
DW 2.27 1.23 2.00 1.86
Akaike 2.55 2.64 2.97 3.74
Schwartz 3.06 3.15 3.53 4.26
Sample 1962-99 1967-99 1962-99 1962-99
N. Obs. 38 33 38 38
A star (two stars) denote significance at the 10% (5%) confidence level.
Dummy variables not reported: 1992 for the German unfication shock, 1968-69 for
France. Standard errors and covariances adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the
Newey-West procedure.Table 2. Long-term unemployment
France Germany Netherlands Switzerland
Constant 0.49 -83.42 ** 4.11 -0.61 8.54 ** 2.73 ** -1.08 ** 0.52
1.47 -2.46 1.04 -0.03 2.03 5.93 -2.92 0.78
Trend 0.35 ** 0.35 ** 0.22 ** 0.22 0.23 ** 0.23 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 **
34.95 35.78 29.46 23.16 16.14 15.91 3.72 3.76
qt -3.48 ** -3.61 ** -1.63 ** -1.21 -4.88 ** -4.99 ** 2.74 ** 2.83 **
-7.97 -9.47 -6.44 -5.03 -6.84 -7.60 3.85 4.08
q -0.51 -0.18 -0.37 ** -0.27 -0.28 -1.88 -1.32 -0.69
-3.60
Constant -3.21 80.42 ** -3.78 1.68 -3.79 -320.94 * 0.45 -1.19
-0.89 2.51 -1.19 0.11 -0.68 -1.71 1.33 -1.53
‘pt 7.52 ** 23.56 ** 4.89 5.39 1.21 679.93 * 1.28 0.03
2.96 2.82 1.47 0.75 0.90 1.78 1.61 0.08
‘pt
2 0.01 -0.77 ** -1.72 ** -1.66 -0.96 -447.56 * 0.57 -0.33
0.01 -3.90 -3.59 -2.96 -1.61 -1.88 1.55 -1.53
‘pt
3 0.27 ** 0.13 108.66 ** -0.31
2.63 0.63 2.30 -1.63
F-Test: p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.016
Adj. R
2 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.76 0.76
SEER 0.43 0.42 0.53 0.63 0.87 0.86 0.79 0.80
DW 1.09 1.28 0.92 1.02 0.76 0.92 0.74 0.79
Akaike 1.31 1.26 1.74 2.06 2.69 2.69 2.52 2.55
Schwartz 1.57 1.55 2.04 2.35 2.94 2.99 2.77 2.85
Sample 1961-99 1961-99 1960-99 1960-99 1961-99 1961-99 1960-99 1960-99
N. Obs. 39 39 40 40 39 39 40 40
A star (two stars) denote significance at the 10% (5%) confidence level.
Dummy variables not reported: 1992 for the German unfication shock, 1968-69 for France. Standard errors and covariances adjusted for heteroskedasticity
using the Newey-West procedure.Table 3. Long-term unemployment
(Panel data)
Germany France Netherlands Switzerland
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trend 0.24 ** 0.36 ** 0.25 ** 0.08 **
31.78 48.70 14.55 3.57
qt -1.52 ** -2.79 ** -3.51 ** 0.38
















N. Obs. 39Table 4. Long-term unemployment- Alternative Measure of Expected Inflation
France Germany Netherlands Switzerland
Constant -3.20 1.62 ** 30.49 0.56 162.08 * 2.10 ** -0.75 * 0.07
-1.36 2.17 1.28 0.80 1.89 3.20 -1.86 0.07
Trend 0.31 ** 0.32 ** 0.24 ** 0.22 ** 0.23 ** 0.23 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 **
13.76 12.75 8.33 10.21 9.41 10.05 4.24 5.74
qt -4.41 ** -3.75 ** -2.50 * -2.34 * -4.26 ** -4.28 ** 2.11 ** 2.28 **
-4.25 -4.87 -1.96 -1.94 -4.13 -4.08 3.11 3.21
q -0.44 -0.66 -0.61 -1.83 -0.24 -0.88 -1.61 -0.70
Constant -0.23 1.50 ** 77.01 684.39 -149.99 * 13.80 7.38 -2.44
-0.04 0.16 1.20 1.27 -1.82 1.38 0.73 -0.91
‘pt 20.69 ** 6.95 ** -144.69 -743.59 -48.78 * -12.57 -29.65 3.95
2.41 0.88 -1.18 -1.32 -1.85 -0.91 -0.87 1.39
‘pt
2 -5.55 ** 0.01 ** 50.08 232.63 0.19 5.76 35.54 -2.10
-2.13 0.00 1.17 1.52 0.23 1.13 1.16 -1.45
‘pt
3 0.78 ** -9.92 -1.10 * -10.76
2.07 -1.23 -1.80 -1.37
F-Test: p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.097 0.209
Adj. R
2 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.93 0.84 0.83 0.73 0.74
SEER 0.69 0.72 0.95 0.88 1.21 1.26 0.84 0.83
DW 0.64 0.56 0.49 0.76 0.51 0.48 0.57 0.56
Akaike 2.27 2.32 2.90 2.75 3.38 3.44 2.64 2.61
Schwartz 2.57 2.58 3.20 3.04 3.68 3.70 2.94 2.87
Sample 1961-99 1961-99 1960-99 1960-99 1961-99 1961-99 1960-99 1960-99
N. Obs. 39 39 40 40 39 39 40 40
A star (two stars) denote significance at the 10% (5%) confidence level.
Dummy variables not reported: 1992 for the German unfication shock, 1968-69 for France. Standard errors and covariances adjusted for heteroskedasticity























(a) Grease effect (b) Sand effect        (c) Grease and sand effects
































































































































































































0 5 10 15 20
UBAR2_D2 UBAR_D2Appendix
























































Sources: Actual inflation and expected fisher: IFS;expected EU Commission and OECD: average of EU Commission forecasts 
(Keereman, 1999) and OECD Economic Outlook December forecasts.